SIBERIAN LAW HERALD
ISSN 2071-8136 (print)
ISSN 2071-8144 (online)

List of issues > Siberian Law Herald 2023. 3

Received on 04.06.2023; approved on 07.08.2023; accepted for publication on 13.09.2023


Subsumption as a model of judicial reasoning in disputable cases: arguments of H. Hart

Author(s)
Kasatkin Sergei Nikolayevich
Abstract
In the light of problems of a proper theoretical description of adjudication, the views of an authoritative British jurist, Herbert Hart are considered. Particular emphasis is placed on his substantiation of the role of subsumption in judicial reasoning against the background of the polemics between legal formalism and (American) legal realism. As a basis of the analysis the author’s essay “Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence” (1955) is taken, being the most expository on the topic, and little studied in Western and Russian literature. The conclusion is drawn, according to which for H. Hart subsumption, on the one hand, does not exhaust the composition of legal reasoning on a case and is not identical to mechanical law-enforcement, on the other hand, it acts as a basic and universal element of adjudication as following legal rules both in clear and in controversial cases.
Keywords
subsumption in law, judicial decision, judicial reasoning, legal indeterminacy, H. Hart, legal formalism, legal realism, legal positivism
About the Authors
Kasatkin Sergei Nikolayevich – Candidate of Juridical Sciences, Associate Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of Theory of Law and Philosophy, Samara State University of Economics (141, Soviet Army st., Samara, 443090, Russian Federation), ORCID: 0000-0001-5541-9181, ReseacherID: AFI-0728-2022, RSCI AuthorID: 623354, e-mail: kasatka_s@bk.ru
For citation
Kasatkin S. N. Subzumpciya kak model' sudebnoj argumentacii v spornyh sluchayah: dovody G. Harta [Subsumption as a model of judicial reasoning in disputable cases: arguments of H. Hart] Sibirskij yuridicheskij vestnik [Siberian Law Herald]. 2023, no 3(102), pp. 87–92. – DOI 10.26516/2071-8136.2023.3.87.
UDC
340.124; 340.132
DOI
https://doi.org/10.26516/2071-8136.2023.3.87
References
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